werner Heisenberg postulated his uncertainty principle--that it is impossible simultaneously to determine the position and the momentum of an electron-in 1927. The idea was picked up by Niels Bohr and incorporated into a more general philosophy of complementarily, according to which the human act of measuring unavoidably affects the qualities of the things measured. Heisenberg spent the war, as we now know, attempting unsuccessfully to help the Third Reich develop an atomic weapon. In later years, he went on to make additional contributions to physics and to argue for the broader philosophical implications of quantum theory. In the latter vein, in 1955, Heisenberg presented his Gifford Lectures in which he criticized "faith in Progress," that faith's "implicit optimism," and the notion of the "limitless extension [of mankind's] material powers." In that context, Heisenberg calls up an image of human vanity, "...mankind seems to be in the situation of a captain whose great ship is so strongly built of steel and iron that his magnetic compass indicates the ferrous mass of the vessel, but not the position of magnetic North. Such a ship cannot reach its goal; it will sail around in circles and eventually become a subject of the winds and the tides."
It is a bleak prophecy. One hopes that the captain might, after a while, notice his difficulties, put the compass aside, and look for a better way to navigate. Today we would solve his problem by handing him a GPS device like the ones used by hikers and found in many upscale cars. The expansion of mankind's material powers may not be limitless, but given a choice between confidence (not faith) in material progress and a pessimistic emphasis on the limits of human inquiry, most Americans would opt for progress.
The estimable Hungarian-born historian John Lukacs disagrees with that assessment. Lukacs, among whose over twenty books include A History of the Cold War, Historical Consciousness, and The Hitler of History, has never shied away from large themes. In his new volume, At the End of an Age,an extended essay, or "summa," as he calls it at one point--Lukacs restates his long-standing quarrel with the idea of "progress," and with several other ideas characteristic of our times. It is a cheerfully grumpy book, written in the tone of a wellread grandfather expatiating to the younger generation how the world has gone to the dogs. He is cranky but lovable. We've seen this character before, in the movies and TV sitcoms. He may be fight about a lot of things, but the act is so overdone, we are more amused than appalled. When he declares, "I am neither a cynic nor a categorical pessimist," you brace yourself for both.
Consider Lukacs' celebration of Werner Heisenberg. While working on the manuscript of Historical Consciousness in the late 1950s, Lukacs read Heisenberg's Gifford Lectures and had an epiphany. He embraced Heisenberg's metaphysical expansion of the principle of uncertainty. In Lukacs reading, humanity would have to give up "unquestioning belief in timeless scientific certitudes." In time, this would develop for Lukacs into a view of "the inseparability of our thinking from matters around us." And, "This human inseparability of the knower from the known means the inevitable participation of the knower in the known."
Heisenberg is a curious choice for culture hero, at least for a figure like Lukacs who writes as both a professing Christian and a sober idealist, a proponent of"a realistic idealism that encompasses the coexistence (and confluence) of matter and spirit." Lukas says the "intelligent idealist," while "understanding the primacy of mind over matter [...] recognizes matter, indeed he must be grateful to it---or to God--for it." He rejects relativism and upholds a conception of history as "the pursuit of truth through a reduction of ignorance, including untruths." He argues that we know history--and truth-only through language. Humans make real choices and understanding history depends greatly on the recognition of "the potentiality within actuality." How do these views square with the Heisenbergian uncertainty? One might think that of all the major scientific figures of the last 150 years, Heisenberg would be among the more difficult to fit with beliefs in a loving God and a world shaped by deeply meaningful personal choices. After all, a theory that emphasizes that the very fabric of the universe forecloses the possibility of much human knowledge offers little encouragement to set about the hard work of reducing our "ignorance."
Why should the captain of that ship, when he at last discovers that, because of his misleading compass, he has been wandering in circles, bother to adopt the new global positioning system? There is bound to be some quantum error in it too. Right?
Lukacs, however, draws a very different set of conclusions from Heisenberg, whose theories he sees as a trump card against "objectivity" and "determinism," and as a means to restore humanity and "the earth on which we live" back to "the center of the universe." Objectivity is "an absolute and antiseptic separation of the observer from the subject or object of his observation," and leads, in Lukacs view, to sterile science and misconceived historical thought. (Lukacs says that instead of seeking to be objective, historians should seek to be "honest.") Determinism is the fallacy of assuming that the universe, in its deepest respects, is governed by impersonal laws. Clearly, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, in some rough way, puts the observer back into the observation and undermines deterministic physics--at least if we focus on subatomic particles.
Whether Heisenberg's idea of uncertainty can bear Lukacs' brand of cosmological inflation is another matter. I, for one, do not find it self-evident that the paradoxes of quantum theory bear directly on the larger world in which most of human history transpires. Either O. J. did it, or he didn't. If I'm ill, I want objective test results, not just someone's "honest" opinion. And deterministic explanations work perfectly well when I'm trying to light the stove or hoping that the letter I drop in the mailbox falls down instead of transforming itself into a flamingo and flying away. The uncertainties that arise from human volition may have some ultimate basis in quantum physics, but no one knows that. Lukacs indeed allows that "Heisenberg's discoveries involve only extreme and subatomic situations," but that doesn't hold him back.
For Lukacs, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle becomes a kind of jujitsu move to turn the force of modern science against itself. He observes that, "it was taken for granted that our laws of physics were the same everywhere and at any time" and he finds such claims "illusory and arrogant." I wonder what Lukacs makes of the recent discovery by the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (a satellite parked in orbit a million miles above the earth) that the laws of physics really do appear to be the same everywhere in the universe? Perhaps he would just repeat, "What science amounts to is a probabilistic kind of knowledge that has its own limits, due to the limits of human nature; and its own limits are due to the mental axioms and operations of the scientists themselves." I take this as kind of sophisticated word play. To the extent it is true, it is trivial. Much scientific knowledge is indeed probabilistic in character and human scientists cannot transcend human nature. They can, however, greatly extend human knowledge by means of instruments that surpass the sensitivity of the human senses
